Galula

Author: A. A. Cohen
Publisher: ABC-CLIO
ISBN: 1440800499
Format: PDF, Kindle
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This comprehensive analytical biography is the definitive work on the life and writings of history's most significant counterinsurgency doctrinaire, David Galula, elucidating the context for his reflections and examining the present and future applicability of his treatise for scholars and practitioners alike.

The New Counter insurgency Era in Critical Perspective

Author: Celeste Ward Gventer
Publisher: Springer
ISBN: 1137336943
Format: PDF
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The notion of counter-insurgency has become a dominant paradigm in American and British thinking about the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. This volume brings together international academics and practitioners to evaluate the broader theoretical and historical factors that underpin COIN, providing a critical reappraisal of counter-insurgency thinking.

Counterinsurgency

Author: Douglas Porch
Publisher: Cambridge University Press
ISBN: 1107244897
Format: PDF
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Counterinsurgency has staked its claim in the new century as the new American way of war. Yet, the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq have revived a historical debate about the costs - monetary, political and moral - of operations designed to eliminate insurgents and build nations. Today's counterinsurgency proponents point to 'small wars' past to support their view that the enemy is 'biddable' if the correct tactical formulas are applied. Douglas Porch's sweeping history of counterinsurgency campaigns carried out by the three 'providential nations' of France, Britain and the United States, ranging from nineteenth-century colonial conquests to General Petraeus' 'Surge' in Iraq, challenges the contemporary mythologising of counterinsurgency as a humane way of war. The reality, he reveals, is that 'hearts and minds' has never been a recipe for lasting stability and that past counterinsurgency campaigns have succeeded not through state-building but by shattering and dividing societies while unsettling civil-military relations.

Counterinsurgency Warfare

Author: David Galula
Publisher: Greenwood Publishing Group
ISBN: 9780275992699
Format: PDF, ePub, Docs
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A template for the defeat of insurgents seeks to define the laws of counterinsurgency warfare, discuss its principles, and outline the corresponding strategy and tactics.

Pacification in Algeria 1956 1958

Author: David Galula
Publisher: Rand Corporation
ISBN: 0833041088
Format: PDF, ePub, Docs
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When Algerian nationalists launched a rebellion against French rule in November 1954, France was forced to cope with a varied and adaptable Algerian strategy. In this volume, originally published in 1963, David Galula reconstructs the story of his highly successful command at the height of the rebellion. This groundbreaking work, with a new foreword by Bruce Hoffman, remains relevant to present-day counterinsurgency operations.

The Insurgents

Author: Fred Kaplan
Publisher: Simon and Schuster
ISBN: 1451642660
Format: PDF, ePub, Docs
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A finalist for the Pulitzer Prize The Insurgents is the inside story of the small group of soldier-scholars, led by General David Petraeus, who plotted to revolutionize one of the largest, oldest, and most hidebound institutions—the United States military. Their aim was to build a new Army that could fight the new kind of war in the post–Cold War age: not massive wars on vast battlefields, but “small wars” in cities and villages, against insurgents and terrorists. These would be wars not only of fighting but of “nation building,” often not of necessity but of choice. Based on secret documents, private emails, and interviews with more than one hundred key characters, including Petraeus, the tale unfolds against the backdrop of the wars against insurgents in Iraq and Afghanistan. But the main insurgency is the one mounted at home by ambitious, self-consciously intellectual officers—Petraeus, John Nagl, H. R. McMaster, and others—many of them classmates or colleagues in West Point’s Social Science Department who rose through the ranks, seized with an idea of how to fight these wars better. Amid the crisis, they forged a community (some of them called it a cabal or mafia) and adapted their enemies’ techniques to overhaul the culture and institutions of their own Army. Fred Kaplan describes how these men and women maneuvered the idea through the bureaucracy and made it official policy. This is a story of power, politics, ideas, and personalities—and how they converged to reshape the twenty-first-century American military. But it is also a cautionary tale about how creative doctrine can harden into dogma, how smart strategists—today’s “best and brightest”—can win the battles at home but not the wars abroad. Petraeus and his fellow insurgents made the US military more adaptive to the conflicts of the modern era, but they also created the tools—and made it more tempting—for political leaders to wade into wars that they would be wise to avoid.

Learning to Eat Soup with a Knife

Author: John A. Nagl
Publisher: University of Chicago Press
ISBN: 9780226567709
Format: PDF, ePub, Mobi
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Nagl considers the crucial question of how armies adapt to changing circumstances during the course of conflicts for which they are initially unprepared. This book is a timely examination of the lessons of previous counterinsurgency campaigns that will be hailed by both military leaders and interested civilians.

Subversion and Insurgency

Author: William Rosenau
Publisher: Rand Corporation
ISBN: 0833042815
Format: PDF
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Subversion is a critical insurgent tool, but it has long been ignored by policymakers and analysts. This paper presents a set of case studies to explore the elements of subversion and discusses preliminary ideas for combating subversive activities in the context of the "long war" against violent Islamic extremism.

Money in the Bank Lessons Learned from Past Counterinsurgency COIN Operations

Author: Angel Rabasa
Publisher: Rand Corporation
ISBN: 0833042831
Format: PDF, ePub
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Six historic counterinsurgency (COIN) operations are examined to determine which tactics, techniques, and procedures led to success and which to failure. The Philippines, Algeria, Vietnam, El Salvador, Jammu and Kashmir, and Colombia were chosen for their varied characteristics relating to geography, historical era, outcome, type of insurgency faced, and level of U.S. involvement. Future U.S. COIN operations can learn from these past lessons.