Deutscher Empirismus

Author: Christian Damböck
Publisher: Springer-Verlag
ISBN: 3319396196
Format: PDF
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Die hier 〈deutscher Empirismus〉 genannte Tradition umfasst als Schlüsselfiguren Wilhelm Dilthey und Hermann Cohen. Das Empirische am 〈deutschen Empirismus〉 liegt nicht in den „Sinnesdaten“, sondern im abstrakten Bereich von Geist und Kultur. Die wissenschaftlichen Disziplinen auf die sich 〈deutsche Empiristen〉 stützen sind primär (wenn auch ohne Ausklammerung der für die theoretische Philosophie grundlegend wichtigen Naturwissenschaften) die Geisteswissenschaften. Das zeigt sich insbesondere in der von den hier diskutierten Autoren vorangetriebenen geisteswissenschaftlichen Grundlagendisziplin der 〈beschreibenden Psychologie〉. Theoretische Philosophie dient im 〈deutschen Empirismus〉 stets bestimmten praktischen (ethischen, ästhetischen und politischen) Zielsetzungen und erhält nur dadurch ihre Rechtfertigung. Rudolf Carnap passt insofern in dieses Bild als auch er, vor allem in seinem Frühwerk, von Ideen 〈deutscher Empiristen〉 ausgegangen ist. Carnap erlaubt uns zu sehen, wie diese Ideen in einer Zeit des zwanzigsten Jahrhunderts erhalten geblieben sind, in der die Philosophie ansonsten eher „auf den eisigen Firnen der Logik ein zurückgezogenes Dasein“ zu führen begann. Uljana Feest (Leibniz Universität Hannover) : „Deutscher Empirismus legt eine eigenwillige neue Achse durch die Philosophiegeschichte des deutschsprachigen 19. Jahrhunderts. Entgegen der herrschenden Meinung, dass die deutschsprachige akademische Philosophie in den mittleren 40 Jahren des 19. Jahrhunderts weitgehend zum Erliegen kam und sich erst ab ca. 1870 wieder zu erholen begann, argumentiert Damböck, dass ab ca. 1830 im Gegenteil eine vielversprechende, ja ‚fortschrittliche‘ (wenn auch heute weitgehend vergessene), philosophische Tradition entstand. Die Arbeit zeichnet sich durch ein feines Gespür für die historiographischen Fallstricke des vorgelegten Argumentes aus. Man hat von Anfang an das Gefühl, es hier mit einem Autor zu tun zu haben, der den ungeheuren Material- und Detailreichtum der von ihm gewählten philosophiehistorischen Epoche souverän beherrscht.“ Massimo Ferrari (Universität Turin): „Deutscher Empirismus bildet einen wertvollen Beitrag zur Erforschung der deutschen Philosophie. Es handelt sich um eine sehr eingehende Analyse, die auf ausführlichen Quellenuntersuchungen beruht und zugleich innovative systematische Ansätze konturiert.“ Lydia Patton (Virginia Tech): „Deutscher Empirismus demonstrates a profound knowledge of nineteenth and early twentieth century philosophy and science. The work promises to inform and to inspire research in the field, and I have little doubt that it will do so.“

Historische Erfahrung und begriffliche Transformation

Author: Max Beck
Publisher:
ISBN: 3643508875
Format: PDF, ePub
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Der Band fragt erstmals in übergreifender Perspektive nach der Bedeutung der amerikanischen Exilerfahrung zwischen 1933 und 1945 für die Entwicklung der deutschsprachigen Philosophie. In 16 Beiträgen wird untersucht, wie das Leben in der amerikanischen Gesellschaft und der Blick auf die Katastrophe in der ehemaligen Heimat zu unterschiedlichen theoretischen Transformationen führten. Die Studien sind nach vier Sektionen gruppiert: (1) Logik und Wissenschaftstheorie, (2) Sozialphilosophie und Gesellschaftstheorie, (3) Rechtsphilosophie und politische Philosophie, (4) Kultur-, Religions- und Geschichtsphilosophie. Ohne Anspruch auf Vollständigkeit wird damit ein Überblick über die Theorien der mehrheitlich jüdischen Philosophinnen und Philosophen im US-amerikanischen Exil geboten, der eine vergleichende Lektüre ermöglicht. Der Band leistet einen Beitrag zur Philosophie- und Wissenschaftsgeschichte des 20. Jahrhunderts ebenso wie zur interdisziplinären Exilforschung.

How History Matters to Philosophy

Author: Robert C. Scharff
Publisher: Routledge
ISBN: 1134626738
Format: PDF, Docs
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In recent decades, widespread rejection of positivism’s notorious hostility toward the philosophical tradition has led to renewed debate about the real relationship of philosophy to its history. How History Matters to Philosophy takes a fresh look at this debate. Current discussion usually starts with the question of whether philosophy’s past should matter, but Scharff argues that the very existence of the debate itself demonstrates that it already does matter. After an introductory review of the recent literature, he develops his case in two parts. In Part One, he shows how history actually matters for even Plato’s Socrates, Descartes, and Comte, in spite of their apparent promotion of conspicuously ahistorical Platonic, Cartesian, and Positivistic ideals. In Part Two, Scharff argues that the real issue is not whether history matters; rather it is that we already have a history, a very distinctive and unavoidable inheritance, which paradoxically teaches us that history’s mattering is merely optional. Through interpretations of Dilthey, Nietzsche, and Heidegger, he describes what thinking in a historically determinate way actually involves, and he considers how to avoid the denial of this condition that our own philosophical inheritance still seems to expect of us. In a brief conclusion, Scharff explains how this book should be read as part of his own effort to acknowledge this condition rather than deny it.

The Routledge Companion to Philosophy of Medicine

Author: Miriam Solomon
Publisher: Taylor & Francis
ISBN: 131751985X
Format: PDF, ePub, Mobi
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The Routledge Companion to Philosophy of Medicine is a comprehensive guide to topics in the fields of epistemology and metaphysics of medicine. It examines traditional topics such as the concept of disease, causality in medicine, the epistemology of the randomized controlled trial, the biopsychosocial model, explanation, clinical judgment and phenomenology of medicine and emerging topics, such as philosophy of epidemiology, measuring harms, the concept of disability, nursing perspectives, race and gender, the metaphysics of Chinese medicine, and narrative medicine. Each of the 48 chapters is written especially for this volume and with a student audience in mind. For pedagogy and clarity, each chapter contains an extended example illustrating the ideas discussed. This text is intended for use as a reference for students in courses in philosophy of medicine and philosophy of science, and pairs well with The Routledge Companion to Bioethics for use in medical humanities and social science courses.

Carnap Tarski and Quine at Harvard

Author: Greg Frost-Arnold
Publisher: Open Court
ISBN: 0812698371
Format: PDF, Docs
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During the academic year 1940-1941, several giants of analytic philosophy congregated at Harvard: Bertrand Russell, Alfred Tarski, Rudlof Carnap, W. V. Quine, Carl Hempel, and Nelson Goodman were all in residence. This group held regular private meetings, with Carnap, Tarski, and Quine being the most frequent attendees. Carnap, Tarski, and Quine at Harvard allows the reader to act as a fly on the wall for their conversations. Carnap took detailed notes during his year at Harvard. This book includes both a German transcription of these shorthand notes and an English translation in the appendix section. Carnap’s notes cover a wide range of topics, but surprisingly, the most prominent question is: if the number of physical items in the universe is finite (or possibly finite), what form should scientific discourse, and logic and mathematics in particular, take? This question is closely connected to an abiding philosophical problem, one that is of central philosophical importance to the logical empiricists: what is the relationship between the logico-mathematical realm and the material realm studied by natural science? Carnap, Tarski, and Quine’s attempts to answer this question involve a number of issues that remain central to philosophy of logic, mathematics, and science today. This book focuses on three such issues: nominalism, the unity of science, and analyticity. In short, the book reconstructs the lines of argument represented in these Harvard discussions, discusses their historical significance (especially Quine’s break from Carnap), and relates them when possible to contemporary treatments of these issues. Nominalism. The founding document of twentieth-century Anglophone nominalism is Goodman and Quine’s 1947 “Steps Toward a Constructive Nominalism.” In it, the authors acknowledge that their project’s initial impetus was the conversations of 1940-1941 with Carnap and Tarski. Frost-Arnold's exposition focuses upon the rationales given for and against the nominalist program at its inception. Tarski and Quine’s primary motivation for nominalism is that mathematical sentences will be ‘unintelligible’ or meaningless, and thus perniciously metaphysical, if (contra nominalism) their component terms are taken to refer to abstract objects. Their solution is to re-interpret mathematical language so that its terms only refer to concrete entities—and if the number of concreta is finite, then portions of classical mathematics will be considered meaningless. Frost-Arnold then identifies and reconstructs Carnap’s two most forceful responses to Tarski and Quine’s view: (1) all of classical mathematics is meaningful, even if the number of concreta is finite, and (2) nominalist strictures lead to absurd consequences in mathematics and logic. The second is familiar from modern debates over nominalism, and its force is proportional to the strength of one’s commitment to preserving all of classical mathematics. The first, however, has no direct correlate in the modern debate, and turns upon the question of whether Carnap’s technique for partially interpreting a language can confer meaningfulness on the whole language. Finally, the author compares the arguments for and against nominalism found in the discussion notes to the leading arguments in the current nominalist debate: the indispensability argument and the argument from causal theories of reference and knowledge. Analyticity. Carnap, Tarski, and Quine’s conversations on finitism have a direct connection to the tenability of the analytic-synthetic distinction: under a finitist-nominalist regime, portions of arithmetic—a supposedly analytic enterprise—become empirical. Other portions of the 1940-41 notes address analyticity directly. Interestingly, Tarski’s criticisms are more sustained and pointed than Quine’s. For example, Tarski suggests that Gödel’s first incompleteness theorem furnishes evidence against Carnap’s conception of analyticity. After reconstructing this argument, Frost-Arnold concludes that it does not tell decisively against Carnap—provided that language is not treated fundamentally proof-theoretically. Quine’s points of disagreement with Carnap in the discussion notes are primarily denials of Carnap’s premises without argument. They do, however, allow us new and more precise characterizations of Carnap and Quine’s differences. Finally, the author forwards two historical conjectures concerning the radicalization of Quine’s critique of analyticity in the period between “Truth by Convention” and “Two Dogmas.” First, the finitist conversations could have shown Quine how the apparently analytic sentences of arithmetic could be plausibly construed as synthetic. Second, Carnap’s shift during his semantic period toward intensional analyses of linguistic concepts, including synonymy, perhaps made Quine, an avowed extensionalist, more skeptical of meaning and analyticity. Unity of Science. The unity of science movement originated in Vienna in the 1920s, and figured prominently in the transplantation of logical empiricism into North America in the 1940s. Carnap, Tarski, and Quine’s search for a total language of science that incorporates mathematical language into that of the natural and social sciences is a clear attempt to unify the language of science. But what motivates the drive for such a unified science? Frost-Arnold locates the answer in the logical empiricists’ antipathy towards speculative metaphysics, in contrast with meaningful scientific claims. I present evidence that, for logical empiricists over several decades, an apparently meaningful assertion or term is metaphysical if and only if that assertion or term cannot be incorporated into a language of unified science. Thus, constructing a single language of science that encompasses the mathematical and natural domains would ensure that mathematical entities are not on par with entelechies and Platonic Forms. The author explores various versions of this criterion for overcoming metaphysics, focusing on Carnap and Neurath. Finally, I consider an obstacle facing their strategy for overcoming metaphysics: there is no effective procedure to show that a given claim or term cannot be incorporated within a language.

Social Inquiry After Wittgenstein and Kuhn

Author: John G. Gunnell
Publisher: Columbia University Press
ISBN: 0231538340
Format: PDF
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A distinctive feature of Ludwig Wittgenstein's work after 1930 was his turn to a conception of philosophy as a form of social inquiry, John G. Gunnell argues, and Thomas Kuhn's approach to the philosophy of science exemplified this conception. In this book, Gunnell shows how these philosophers address foundational issues in the social and human sciences, particularly the vision of social inquiry as an interpretive endeavor and the distinctive cognitive and practical relationship between social inquiry and its subject matter. Gunnell speaks directly to philosophers and practitioners of the social and human sciences. He tackles the demarcation between natural and social science; the nature of social phenomena; the concept and method of interpretation; the relationship between language and thought; the problem of knowledge of other minds; and the character of descriptive and normative judgments about practices that are the object of inquiry. Though Wittgenstein and Kuhn are often criticized as initiating a modern descent into relativism, this book shows that the true effect of their work was to undermine the basic assumptions of contemporary social and human science practice. It also problematized the authority of philosophy and other forms of social inquiry to specify the criteria for judging such matters as truth and justice. When Wittgenstein stated that "philosophy leaves everything as it is," he did not mean that philosophy would be left as it was or that philosophy would have no impact on what it studied, but rather that the activity of inquiry did not, simply by virtue of its performance, transform the object of inquiry.

Logischer Empirismus Werte und Moral

Author: Anne Siegetsleitner
Publisher: Springer-Verlag
ISBN: 3709101603
Format: PDF, ePub, Docs
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Trotz ihres sozialen und politischen Engagements wurden die Logischen Empiristen – allen voran die Mitglieder des Wiener Kreises – nicht für ihr Interesse an Ethik und Wertphilosophie bekannt. Ihnen wurde sogar vorgeworfen, Werte und Moral zu zerstören. Die Autorinnen und Autoren liefern in diesem Band eine längst fällige Neubewertung logisch-empiristischer Positionen hinsichtlich der Frage von Werten und Moral. Sie beleuchten die wissenschaftlich-humanistisch motivierte Ablehnung traditioneller Ethik jenseits von vorherrschenden Klischeebildern.

Zwischen geistiger Erneuerung und Restauration

Author: Christian H. Stifter
Publisher:
ISBN:
Format: PDF
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The book discusses the origins and the formation of U.S. reorientation strategies for post-war democratization and its implementation in the aftermath of World War II, exemplified by case studies of university and academic reconstruction in Austria in the years from 1945 to 1955. The study illustrates and analyzes both the changes and the specific implementations of U.S. reorientation strategies, starting with the war years and continuing up to U.S. propaganda strategies at the outbreak of the Cold War and its subsequent ramifications of post-war-democratization. After the end of World War II, the initial civil intent of U.S. reorientation was to foster a sustainable peacebuilding process by means of intellectual disarmament and a set of long-term democratization measures. The focus of reorientation narrowed first to the limited repertoire of educational and academic policy before ultimately becoming a propaganda instrument of the Cold War.