The Language of Game Theory

Author: Adam Brandenburger
Publisher: World Scientific
ISBN: 981451344X
Format: PDF, Mobi
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This volume contains eight papers written by Adam Brandenburger and his co-authors over a period of 25 years. These papers are part of a program to reconstruct game theory in order to make how players reason about a game a central feature of the theory. The program OCo now called epistemic game theory OCo extends the classical definition of a game model to include not only the game matrix or game tree, but also a description of how the players reason about one another (including their reasoning about other players' reasoning). With this richer mathematical framework, it becomes possible to determine the implications of how players reason for how a game is played. Epistemic game theory includes traditional equilibrium-based theory as a special case, but allows for a wide range of non-equilibrium behavior. Sample Chapter(s). Foreword (39 KB). Introduction (132 KB). Chapter 1: An Impossibility Theorem on Beliefs in Games (299 KB). Contents: An Impossibility Theorem on Beliefs in Games (Adam Brandenburger and H Jerome Keisler); Hierarchies of Beliefs and Common Knowledge (Adam Brandenburger and Eddie Dekel); Rationalizability and Correlated Equilibria (Adam Brandenburger and Eddie Dekel); Intrinsic Correlation in Games (Adam Brandenburger and Amanda Friedenberg); Epistemic Conditions for Nash Equilibrium (Robert Aumann and Adam Brandenburger); Lexicographic Probabilities and Choice Under Uncertainty (Lawrence Blume, Adam Brandenburger, and Eddie Dekel); Admissibility in Games (Adam Brandenburger, Amanda Friedenberg and H Jerome Keisler); Self-Admissible Sets (Adam Brandenburger and Amanda Friedenberg). Readership: Graduate students and researchers in the fields of game theory, theoretical computer science, mathematical logic and social neuroscience."

The Language of Game Theory

Author: Adam Brandenburger
Publisher: World Scientific
ISBN: 9814513458
Format: PDF, Mobi
Download Now
This volume contains eight papers written by Adam Brandenburger and his co-authors over a period of 25 years. These papers are part of a program to reconstruct game theory in order to make how players reason about a game a central feature of the theory. The program — now called epistemic game theory — extends the classical definition of a game model to include not only the game matrix or game tree, but also a description of how the players reason about one another (including their reasoning about other players' reasoning). With this richer mathematical framework, it becomes possible to determine the implications of how players reason for how a game is played. Epistemic game theory includes traditional equilibrium-based theory as a special case, but allows for a wide range of non-equilibrium behavior. Contents:An Impossibility Theorem on Beliefs in Games (Adam Brandenburger and H Jerome Keisler)Hierarchies of Beliefs and Common Knowledge (Adam Brandenburger and Eddie Dekel)Rationalizability and Correlated Equilibria (Adam Brandenburger and Eddie Dekel)Intrinsic Correlation in Games (Adam Brandenburger and Amanda Friedenberg)Epistemic Conditions for Nash Equilibrium (Robert Aumann and Adam Brandenburger)Lexicographic Probabilities and Choice Under Uncertainty (Lawrence Blume, Adam Brandenburger, and Eddie Dekel)Admissibility in Games (Adam Brandenburger, Amanda Friedenberg and H Jerome Keisler)Self-Admissible Sets (Adam Brandenburger and Amanda Friedenberg) Readership: Graduate students and researchers in the fields of game theory, theoretical computer science, mathematical logic and social neuroscience. Keywords:Game Theory;Epistemic Game Theory;Foundations;Applied Mathematics;Social Neuroscience;Rationalizability;Nash Equilibrium;Probability;UncertaintyKey Features:Focuses on epistemic game theory — an emerging approach to game theoryLikely strong interest in these tools from other disciplines, includingtheoretical computer science, mathematical logic, and social neuroscienceProminent co-author team: Robert Aumann (Hebrew University, Nobel Laureate 2005); Lawrence Blume (Cornell University); Eddie Dekel (Northwestern University and Tel Aviv University); Amanda Freedeneurg (Arizona State University); H Jerome Keisler (University of Wisconsin Madison)Reviews: "Adam Brandenburger's work on the knowledge requirements implicit in game theory has become classic. These are of profound importance in understanding the relevance of game theory and, indeed, economic theory in general to the real economy. It is very good to have them collected, with an introduction that brings out the underlying themes." Kenneth J Arrow Stanford University, USA "Over the past decade epistemic game theory has emerged as one of the principled alternatives to more traditional approaches to economic interactions and Adam Brandenburger has played a central role in that emergence. For anyone interested in epistemic game theory, or game theory in general, this book is a must have. But even more important is the opportunity this volume, and epistemic game theory in general, presents to empirical scientists. As Brandenburger notes in his Introduction, until now epistemic game theory has been a theoretical discipline. This volume should make it clear, however, that it could be — and likely soon will be — an empirical undertaking. Anyone interested in behavioral, psychological, or neurobiological studies of how we make decisions during strategic play will find in this volume a profoundly fascinating set of empirically testable hypotheses just waiting to be examined." Paul Glimcher New York University, USA "Three hundred years ago, Francis Waldegrave found the first minimax solution of a matrix game. But in his correspondence with mathematicians Pierre Rémond de Montmort and Nicolaus Bernoulli, Waldegrave counseled that epistemic considerations involving knowledge, beliefs, uncertainty, and incomplete information also mattered. The principal practitioners of game theory, with the notable exceptions of John Harsanyi and Robert Aumann, have ignored this advice. In recent years, these two theorists have been joined by Adam Brandenburger, whose work on epistemic game theory has been collected in this splendid volume. Eight classic papers by Brandenburger with a number of co-authors present an authoritative view of the field while an insightful introduction provides a roadmap to research both present and future." Harold W Kuhn Princeton University, USA "This book features a collection of foundational papers by Adam Brandenburger in epistemic game theory. Though still evolving, this approach marks a tectonic shift in game theory by offering a new, epistemic dimension which might be compared to the introduction of synchronized sound to motion pictures in the early 20th century: it might not immediately provide a complete picture, but it has the potential of changing the field forever." Sergei N Artemov The Graduate Center of the City University of New York, USA "Adam Brandenburger has played a leading role in developing the program of epistemic game theory, the goal of which is to provide a deeper and clearer foundation for game theory as a whole. This volume collects a remarkable body of work by Brandenburger and his collaborators, in which penetrating conceptual analysis and the development of a rich mathematical theory go hand in hand. The work offers much of great interest to computer scientists, who will see many connections with their study of recursive and corecursive structures, of processes and their logics, and of multi-agent systems; and to mathematicians and logicians interested in making precise models of the reflexive structures inherent in systems containing rational agents who can reason about the system of which they form a part. I hope that this timely collection will help to stimulate cross-disciplinary work on these fundamental topics." Samson Abramsky Oxford University, UK "Games are playgrounds where players meet and interact, guided by streams of information and opinion. Adam Brandenburger's work has been instrumental in creating a new rich epistemic framework doing justice to both games and their players. This timely book will help a broader audience learn and appreciate the resulting theory." Johan van Benthem University of Amsterdam, The Netherlands and Stanford University, USA "Economics, so grounded in the notion of equilibrium, has required substantial foundational work on reasoning about reasoning — epistemics — in interacting situations (games). Yet, if plain reasoning is difficult enough, just imagine epistemics. Adam Brandenburger, as is evident from the elegant and clear chapters of this book, is a master of the trade. His highly regarded research, always subtle and deep, is of the kind that establishes milestones while at the same time opening up vistas to new, and unexpected, frontiers. This book is specialized, certainly, but it is a must." Andreu Mas-Colell Universitat Pompeu Fabra, Spain “The papers in this book had a huge impact on the field, created an inter– and multi–discipliner research within the intersection of economics, philosophy, mathematics and computer science, and also inspired countless amount of PhD dissertations. Brandenburger's work contains very precise and beautiful mathematics, an earthly reading of epistemics and a puzzling innovation.” Zentralblatt MATH

Uncertainty Within Economic Models

Author: Hansen Lars Peter
Publisher: World Scientific
ISBN: 9814578134
Format: PDF, ePub
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Written by Lars Peter Hansen (Nobel Laureate in Economics, 2013) and Thomas Sargent (Nobel Laureate in Economics, 2011), Uncertainty within Economic Models includes articles adapting and applying robust control theory to problems in economics and finance. This book extends rational expectations models by including agents who doubt their models and adopt precautionary decisions designed to protect themselves from adverse consequences of model misspecification. This behavior has consequences for what are ordinarily interpreted as market prices of risk, but big parts of which should actually be interpreted as market prices of model uncertainty. The chapters discuss ways of calibrating agents' fears of model misspecification in quantitative contexts.

Models of Bounded Rationality and Mechanism Design

Author: Jacob Glazer
Publisher: World Scientific Publishing Company
ISBN: 9813141336
Format: PDF, Docs
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This book brings together the authors' joint papers from over a period of more than twenty years. The collection includes seven papers, each of which presents a novel and rigorous model in Economic Theory. All of the models are within the domain of implementation and mechanism design theories. These theories attempt to explain how incentive schemes and organizations can be designed with the goal of inducing agents to behave according to the designer's (principal's) objectives. Most of the literature assumes that agents are fully rational. In contrast, the authors inject into each model an element which conflicts with the standard notion of full rationality, demonstrating how such elements can dramatically change the mechanism design problem. Although all of the models presented in this volume touch on mechanism design issues, it is the formal modeling of bounded rationality that the authors are most interested in. A model of bounded rationality signifies a model that contains a procedural element of reasoning that is not consistent with full rationality. Rather than looking for a canonical model of bounded rationality, the articles introduce a variety of modeling devices that will capture procedural elements not previously considered, and which alter the analysis of the model. The book is a journey into the modeling of bounded rationality. It is a collection of modeling ideas rather than a general alternative theory of implementation.

Pareto Nash Stackelberg Game and Control Theory

Author: Valeriu Ungureanu
Publisher: Springer
ISBN: 3319751514
Format: PDF, Kindle
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This book presents a comprehensive new, multi-objective and integrative view on traditional game and control theories. Consisting of 15 chapters, it is divided into three parts covering noncooperative games; mixtures of simultaneous and sequential multi-objective games; and multi-agent control of Pareto-Nash-Stackelberg-type games respectively. Can multicriteria optimization, game theory and optimal control be integrated into a unique theory? Are there mathematical models and solution concepts that could constitute the basis of a new paradigm? Is there a common approach and method to solve emerging problems? The book addresses these and other related questions and problems to create the foundation for the Pareto-Nash-Stackelberg Game and Control Theory. It considers a series of simultaneous/Nash and sequential/Stackelberg games, single-criterion and multicriteria/Pareto games, combining Nash and Stackelberg game concepts and Pareto optimization, as well as a range of notions related to system control. In addition, it considers the problems of finding and representing the entire set of solutions. Intended for researches, professors, specialists, and students in the areas of game theory, operational research, applied mathematics, economics, computer science and engineering, it also serves as a textbook for various courses in these fields.

Gl ck Logik und Bluff

Author: Jörg Bewersdorff
Publisher: Springer-Verlag
ISBN: 3322919153
Format: PDF, ePub, Docs
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Der Autor hat es in bewundernswerter Weise geschafft, anhand einer Vielzahl bekannter Spiele von Schach über Poker bis Mastermind einen kleinen Einblick in mathematisch so anspruchsvolle Gebiete wie Wahrscheinlichkeitsrechnung, Optimierungstheorie, Kombinatorik und Spieltheorie zu geben. Hierbei werden so gut wie keine mathematischen Vorkenntnisse erwartet, so dass man das Buch auch interessierten Nichtmathematikern wärmstens empfehlen kann. Anspruchsvolle und unerschrockene Leserinnen und Leser werden in den sehr lesenswerten Anmerkungen am Schluss des Buches Hinweise auf weiterführende Literatur finden, anhand derer sie auch tiefer in mathematische Aspekte eindringen können. Ein schönes Buch, ohne wirkliche Konkurrenz auf dem deutschen Markt, und dies zu einem vernünftigen Preis. Zentralblatt MATH Database 1931 - 2002

Friedrich List 1789 1846

Author: Eugen Wendler
Publisher: Springer-Verlag
ISBN: 3658026448
Format: PDF, Mobi
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​In dieser ebenso unterhaltsamen wie informativen Biografie wird die Wirkungs- und Rezeptionsgeschichte der Theorien von Friedrich List auf der Basis seines außergewöhnlichen Lebenslaufes dargestellt. Der renommierte und mehrfach für seine Forschung ausgezeichnete List-Experte Eugen Wendler fasst hier die Ergebnisse seiner langjährigen Forschungsarbeit zusammen und ergänzt sie durch neueste Erkenntnisse und Quellen. So ist ein umfassendes und werthaltiges Werk entstanden, das zudem zahlreiche bislang noch unbekannte Abbildungen enthält.

Wer will schon einen Vampir

Author: Lynsay Sands
Publisher: BASTEI LÜBBE
ISBN: 3802585585
Format: PDF, Docs
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Vampire gibt es nicht ... oder? Inez Urso kommen langsam gewisse Zweifel. Ihr Geschäftspartner, der gut aussehende Thomas Argeneau, leidet unter einer Sonnenallergie, kann wunderbar im Dunkeln sehen und scheint sich nicht viel aus fester Nahrung zu machen. Und seinem geradezu übermenschlichen Charme kann sie nur schwer widerstehen. Thomas ist sich sicher, in Inez seine Seelengefährtin gefunden zu haben. Nun setzt er alles daran, sie davon zu überzeugen, dass sie füreinander bestimmt sind. Doch Inez hegt den festen Grundsatz, Berufliches nicht mit Privatem zu vermischen...